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Summary
The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is a key node within the
‘‘social brain’’ [1]. Several studies suggest that the TPJ
controls representations of the self or another individual
across a variety of low-level (agency discrimination [2],
visual perspective taking [3], control of imitation [4]) and
high-level (mentalizing, empathy [4–6]) sociocognitive pro-
cesses.We exploredwhether sociocognitive abilities relying
on on-line control of self and other representations could be
modulated with transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) of TPJ. Participants received excitatory (anodal),
inhibitory (cathodal), or sham stimulation before completing
three sociocognitive tasks. Anodal stimulation improved the
on-line control of self-other representations elicited by the
imitation and perspective-taking tasks while not affecting
attribution of mental states during a self-referential task
devoid of such a requirement. Our findings demonstrate
the efficacy of tDCS to improve social cognition and high-
light the potential for tDCS to be used as a tool to aid self-
other processing in clinical populations.
Results
The majority of our knowledge concerning TPJ function has
been provided by functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies. Brain stimulation methods such as tDCS are
an important addition to fMRI, as they allow cortical excitability
to be directly manipulated. TDCS is a noninvasive technique
that stimulates the cerebral cortex with a weak constant elec-
tric current passed between two electrodes (anodal and cath-
odal) on the scalp. Current flows from an active to a reference
electrode causing either decreased (cathodal) or enhanced
(anodal) cortical excitability. In nonsocial domains, anodal
stimulation has been shown to enhance perceptual [7] and
motor [8] learning, while the effects of cathodal stimulation
are less reliable [9]. In the social domain, studies employing
tDCS remain limited, and, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to stimulate TPJ using tDCS.
Consistent TPJ activation acrossmany sociocognitive tasks
suggests a basic function shared by both low-level and higher-
order sociocognitive processes. One potential candidate func-
tion is the on-line control of self-other representations i.e., the*Correspondence: g.bird@bbk.ac.ukbiasing of processing toward either the self or the other when
task demands cause both the self and the other to be repre-
sented [4, 10, 11]. We tested the hypothesis that anodal
stimulation of TPJ should lead to enhanced sociocognitive
abilities: specifically, by enhancing the ability to control, on-
line, coactivated representations of the self and the other.
Participants received anodal (n = 17), cathodal (n = 17), or
sham (n = 15) stimulation—which produces the same sensa-
tion as active stimulation but has no effect on neuronal popu-
lations [12]—of right TPJ for 20 min prior to completing three
sociocognitive tasks. Two of these tasks required self and
other representations to be controlled (the perspective-taking
task required the self to be inhibited and the other enhanced,
while the control-of-imitation task required the other to be in-
hibited and the self enhanced), whereas the third task (the
self-referential task) did not require on-line self-other control.
During the control-of-imitation task, participants were asked
to perform either the same (congruent trials) or a different
(incongruent trials) finger movement as that observed on
a computer screen. Incongruent trials require participants to
inhibit an imitative response and therefore distinguish and
control motor representations evoked by the self and the
other. Self representations must be enhanced, and other
representations inhibited. Thus, improved imitative control is
indexed by a reduced tendency to imitate (imitation effect:
incongruent RT – congruent RT) driven by faster performance
on incongruent trials. This pattern was observed when the
anodal group was compared to the cathodal group: the anodal
group showed a significantly reduced imitation effect (anodal:
M = 16.15 ms, SEM = 5.73; cathodal: M = 52.50 ms, SEM =
10.88, p = 0.04; Figure 1A). The comparison between the
anodal and sham (M = 52.30 ms, SEM = 13.21) groups ap-
proached significance at p = 0.051. The decreased imitation
effect found in the anodal (versus cathodal) group was driven
by faster responses on incongruent trials (anodal:M = 446.45,
SEM = 17.80; cathodal: M = 537.06, SEM = 17.80; p = 0.002).
In the perspective-taking task, participants were required to
adopt the viewpoint of a ‘‘director’’ who gave them instructions
to move objects on a shelf (Figure S1 available online). Exper-
imental trials involved a conflict between the director’s and the
participant’s perspective, and therefore control of self and
other representations was again necessary for accurate
performance. However, in contrast to the control-of-imitation
task, accurate performance on this task requires enhancement
of the other and inhibition of the self perspective. Neverthe-
less, anodal stimulation to TPJ also improved performance
on the perspective-taking task such that the anodal group
(proportion correct M = 0.86, SEM = 0.07) was better able to
take the director’s perspective than the cathodal (M = 0.60,
SEM = 0.07; p = 0.031) and the sham (M = 0.53, SEM = 0.07;
p = 0.006) groups (Figure 1B).
Finally, in the self-referential task, participants were asked
to make mental (‘‘think people should know they are appreci-
ated’’) or physical (‘‘have very smooth skin’’) judgments about
themselves or another person, before later completing a
surprise recognition memory test for the judgments. On each
trial either the self or the other is represented; therefore, in
contrast to the previous tasks, there is no requirement for
Figure 1. Anodal tDCS of rTPJ Improves On-Line Control of Self-Other
Representations
(A) Control of imitation. This task examined the ability to distinguish and
control motor representations evoked by the self and the other. Improved
performance after anodal stimulation (in comparison to cathodal and
sham stimulation) is indexed by a reduced tendency to imitate.
(B) Perspective taking. This task required participants to take another’s
perspective and inhibit their own (see Figure S1). Anodal stimulation
resulted in more accurate performance.
(C) Self-referential. This task examined participants’ ability to attribute
mental states to the self or another individual. Unlike the tasks that required
on-line control of self-other representations (control of imitation and
perspective taking), no effect of rTPJ stimulation was found onmental state
attribution (self-referential task).
Error bars represent the SEM. See also Figure S1.
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As a consequence, despite the presence of the standard
‘‘self-reference effect’’ [13] (indexed by faster RTs [F(1,46) =16.33, p < 0.001], Figure 1C) and improved memory perfor-
mance [F(1,44) = 24.19, p < 0.001] for self judgments in all three
groups, rTPJ stimulation did not selectively affect processing
of either physical or mental judgments concerning either the
self or the other. The anodal group was faster on all judgments
than the cathodal group (p = .003). However, none of the inter-
actions between the type of stimulation, target of judgment
(self versus other), and type of judgment (mental versus phys-
ical), factors were significant (for all, pR 0.24). Performance on
the surprise recognition memory test for self and other judg-
ments also revealed no effect of stimulation (for all, p > 0.42).
Discussion
Anodal stimulation of the right TPJ enhanced the ability to
control imitation and take the visual perspective of another,
but it did not affect the ability to attribute mental states to
the self or others. These findings suggest that within the realm
of social cognition, the area of the right TPJ stimulated in this
study is recruited in situations where on-line control of coacti-
vated self and other representations is crucial for successful
social interaction. The control-of-imitation task requires
participants to distinguish between their own action intentions
and those of the ‘‘other’’ (represented by the stimulus hand on
the screen) and to carry out their own motor intention rather
than the observed action. On-line control of self and other
representations is also crucial in the visual perspective-taking
task, except that in this task one must inhibit the self perspec-
tive and enhance that of the ‘‘other.’’ In the self-referential task,
faster responses of the anodal (compared to the cathodal)
group on all trial types suggest that anodal stimulation of
TPJ improved participants’ ability to make judgments about
both the self and the other. This result therefore provides
further support for the commonly reported role of TPJ in repre-
sentation of the self and the other. We have suggested that
successful performance on this task does not require the
distinction or control of coactivated self and other representa-
tions. On each trial, before making a mental or physical judg-
ment, participants are cued as towhether the judgment relates
to the self or to the other, and therefore it is likely that only the
self or the other is represented, but not both. However, it could
be argued that on every trial both the self and other is repre-
sented, despite the cue, and that therefore self-other control
is required in this task. If so, then the main effect of stimulation
further supports the role of the TPJ in the domain-general
control of self and other representations. Regardless of which
interpretation is correct, the absence of a significant interac-
tion between type of stimulation and target (self versus other)
and judgment type (mental versus physical) suggests that
processes supporting the on-line control of self and other
representations are independent of those required to attribute
mental states [4].
Previous research using a combination of tDCS and fMRI
[14] has shown that tDCS has a focal effect at the site of stim-
ulation and on interconnected areas in a functional network
but does not affect neural responses of regions within the
vicinity of the anodal electrode. Therefore, our results are
unlikely to be due to a nonspecific increase of cortical excit-
ability in adjacent brain regions. Nevertheless, it is important
to acknowledge that tDCS does not have the spatial specificity
to allow us to distinguish functional subdivisions in the TPJ.
Indeed, given that we did not include an active control site,
the anatomical specificity of our results is difficult to deter-
mine. It will be interesting to examine the role that different
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different brain stimulation methodologies like transcranial
magnetic stimulation.
In the nonsocial domain, right TPJ activation has been found
in attention reorienting [15, 16]. Although recent research
suggests that attention reorienting and attribution of mental
states recruit partially distinct regions of right TPJ [17], some
researchers propose that the overlapping activation could
reflect shared cognitive processes between these two mental
abilities (for an overview, see [18]). The control of self and other
representations as described here results in the biasing of pro-
cessing toward self or other when both representations are
active. It is plausible that the same TPJ-mediated processes
that allocate attention to regions of space are also used to allo-
cate attention to either self or other representations.
Appropriate control of self and other representations has
been shown to be important for positive social interactions
such as prosocial behavior [19] and is impaired in those with
autism spectrum conditions [20]. These findings therefore
indicate the potential for tDCS to be used as a tool to enhance
self-other processing, which may have therapeutic benefits in
individuals in whom this process has broken down.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Forty-nine right-handed adults (24 females, age range 18–45 years, M =
26.5, SD = 6.7) participated in this study for a small monetary reward. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to the anodal (n = 17), cathodal (n = 17), or
control ‘‘sham’’ (n = 15) groups. Groups did not differ in terms of age
[F(2,48) = 0.35, p = 0.7] or gender (c
2 = 0.16, p = 0.9). All participants were
healthy volunteers, without any known developmental or neurological disor-
ders and no contraindications to tDCS. They were all naive with respect to
experimental hypotheses and remained unaware of what type of stimulation
they received until the end of the experiment.
Procedure
Prior to the testing session, all participants were provided with written infor-
mation about the study and a description of the tDCS procedure. The asso-
ciated safety/risk warnings were explained, and participants were asked to
sign an informed consent form. This study received full ethical approval by
the local ethics committee.
The stimulation was induced with two saline-soaked surface sponge
electrodes 35 cm2 in size and delivered by a battery-driven, constant current
stimulator. For the stimulation of the rTPJ, the anodal or cathodal (depend-
ing on the group assignment) electrode was placed over CP6 (electroen-
cephalography 10/20 system) [21]. The reference electrode was placed
over the vertex, individually measured on each participant. A relatively
weak electrical current (1 mA) was delivered for 20min. For the sham group,
the setup was identical to the anodal group, but the stimulator was only
turned on for 15 s; participants felt the initial itching sensation associated
with tDCS but received no active current for the rest of the stimulation
period. Off-line stimulation (i.e., stimulation preceding task performance)
was used as previous work suggests that effects are more robust than
on-line stimulation, at least for anodal stimulation [22].
Participants were not tested before and after stimulation due to the
considerable likelihood of ceiling effects as a result of practice on the
control-of-imitation and perspective-taking tasks. In addition, the self-refer-
ential task is not amenable to two testing sessions, as it requires a surprise
memory test. It is unlikely that pre-existing differences in social ability
(despite random allocation to groups) could explain the pattern of results,
given the levels of statistical significance observed (likelihood of obtaining
these data if the null hypothesis is true). However, given the considerable
interindividual variability in social ability, these results stand in need of repli-
cation both in other samples and in those populations that are theorized to
have atypical self-other control (e.g., autism spectrum conditions).
In order to standardize thememory delay between the self-referential task
and the surprise memory test, the tasks were administered to all partici-
pants in the following order: control of imitation, self-referential, perspective
taking, andmemory test for self-referential task. A description of each of thetasks is provided below. Significant effects of stimulation on the control-of-
imitation and perspective-taking tasks suggest that, at minimum, stimula-
tion effects lasted until the start of the self-referential memory task.
However, stimulation is likely to have been effective over a longer time
period. Previous studies have shown that, for humans, 13 min of off-line
anodal tDCS at 1 mA results in a sustained increase in cortical excitability
for up to 90 min after stimulation, after which there is a linear decrease to
baseline levels [23]. Increased duration of stimulation is known to prolong
the effects of tDCS stimulation [24]. Therefore, the 20 min of off-line anodal
tDCS at 1 mA used here is expected to induce sustained increases in
cortical excitability for at least 2 hr. This is significantly in excess of the
60 min testing time.
Control-of-Imitation Task
Based on a previous version by Brass and colleagues [25], the stimuli
consisted of short videos showing either an index or middle finger
performing a lifting movement. The stimulus hand was rotated around the
sagittal and transverse planes with respect to the participant’s hand,
which rested on the computer keyboard. This set up allowed imitative
effects to be separated from those due to spatial compatibility. Participants
were asked to respond with an index or middle finger lifting action to
a number cue that appeared between the fingers of the stimulus
hand. They were asked to lift their index finger upon appearance of a 1,
and their middle finger upon appearance of a 2. At the same time as the
appearance of the number cue, there was a lifting movement of the index
or middle finger of the stimulus hand. Although the observed movements
were formally task irrelevant, the relationship between the observed move-
ment and the movement required by the number defined two trial types. On
congruent trials, the required finger movement was the same as the
observed movement, whereas on incongruent trials, the required finger
movement was different from the observed movement. Thus, on incon-
gruent trials, participants were required to inhibit an imitative response
and perform the preinstructed movement. Twenty trials in each of the four
combinations of observed and executed finger movements were presented
in a random order.
Perspective-Taking Task
We used a computerized version of the original task developed by Keysar
and colleagues [26] that required participants to take into account the point
of view of a character, introduced as ‘‘the director.’’ The visual stimuli
consisted of a 4 3 4 grid (‘‘shelves’’) containing eight different objects.
Five slots were occluded from the view of the director, who stood on the
other side of the shelves (see Figure S1). Participants listened to auditory
instructions from the director who asked them to move specified objects
in a particular direction. On experimental trials, there was a conflict between
the participant’s and the director’s perspective. For example, if the partici-
pant was presented with the array shown in Figure S1A, and was asked to
‘‘move the large candle up,’’ they should ignore the largest candle they
can see, the ‘‘competitor object,’’ (because the director cannot see it),
and instead move the next largest candle, which is visible to the director.
There were two control conditions: C1 and C2. In C1, the director instructed
participants to move an object placed in one of the clear slots (e.g.,
the mug), and therefore there was no conflict between the perspectives of
the participant and the director. In C2, an irrelevant object replaced the
‘‘competitor’’ item from the experimental condition, but the instruction
remained the same (see Figure S1B). Accuracy of the selection and move-
ment of the target object and reaction times were recorded.
Self-Referential Task
This task was adapted from a previous version used by Lombardo and
colleagues [27]. Participants were asked to make either mental or physical
judgments about themselves or a famous person (Lady Gaga). At the begin-
ning of the task, they read a brief bio of Lady Gaga and were told that they
would be asked to rate how likely either Lady Gaga (other) or the participant
themselves (self) were to have certain opinions, likes, and dislikes. For
example, an ‘‘other-mental’’ judgment would be ‘‘How likely is she to enjoy
the adrenaline rush of taking risks?’’ whereas a ‘‘self-physical’’ judgment
could be ‘‘How likely are you to have large feet?’’ Prior to each trial, either
‘‘YOU’’ or ‘‘LADY GAGA’’ was presented on the screen for 2 s (font size
45 pt). Therefore, participants knew before the start of data (RT) collection
whether the following opinion judgment would relate to the self or the other.
There were 20 items in each trial type (self-mental, self-physical, other-
mental, and other-physical). Participants made judgments on a scale of
1–4 (1 = not at all likely, 4 = very likely). The self versus other statements
were counterbalanced within each group. To encourage participants to
engage with the task and therefore elicit ‘‘other’’ thoughts in the Lady
Gaga condition, they were told that their answers would be compared to
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receive an ‘‘accuracy score’’ at the end. This ‘‘score’’ was randomly gener-
ated and presented on the screen at the end of the task. Reaction times for
each trial type were recorded.
Surprise Memory Test
This was administered after completion of the perspective-taking task,
approximately 25 min after the self-referential task. Participants were pre-
sented with a judgment statement and asked to rate how confident they
were that they had seen it before on a scale of 1–6 (1 = definitely not seen
it, 2 = probably not seen it, 3 = possibly not seen it, 4 = possibly seen it,
5 = probably seen it, 6 = definitely seen it). For items that they thought
they had seen before (those rated from 4–6), participants were further asked
to rate how confident theywere that the statement was in reference to them-
selves or to Lady Gaga (1 = definitely self, 6 = definitely Lady Gaga). Twenty
‘‘old’’ (previously presented) and 20 ‘‘new’’ (matched for number of words)
statements for each condition were presented.
Statistical Analyses
For a description of statistical analyses performed and a full description of
control analyses, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and one figure and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.cub.2012.10.018.
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